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Korea has experienced one of the most impressive economic records of
modern capitalism. Following the Korean War, from which the country
emerged as one of the poorest in the world, the economy registered four
decades of almost uninterrupted rapid growth. Today, per capita income
has reached about 65 per cent of the OECD average (close to the levels in
Greece and Portugal), while Korea has earned an international reputation
as a successful exporter of technologically advanced goods, such as
microchips and electronic equipment.
The financial crisis, which started at the end of 1997, brought the growth
process to a sudden, unexpected halt. The crisis forced the government
to agree to a rescue package with the IMF. Unemployment rocketed to a
peak of 8-1/2 per cent in early 1999, and more than one million Koreans
were thrown into poverty. The difficult economic and social situation
forced the authorities to implement quickly a wide range of macro-
economic and structural reforms, including in the areas of labour market
policies and social safety nets. In response to these reforms, the economy
has now turned the corner, permitting the unemployment rate to fall rap-
idly to about 5 per cent, and short-term prospects point to a continuation
of the solid recovery.
In this context, it may be tempting to assume that the crisis was just a blip
in an otherwise high-growth path and that, as a consequence, a pause in
the reform agenda might be called for. On the contrary, while Korea has
achieved a great deal in a very short period of time, much remains to be
done to strengthen the social sustainability of the development process.
Further action to consolidate the industrial relations system, reform
labour law, and to improve the coverage and effectiveness of labour mar-
ket and social safety-net policies. The recovery should not lead to any let-
up in these policy reforms.
Indeed, future improvements in living standards will have to rest on using
resources more efficiently, rather than more intensively as was the case
before the 1997 crisis. A more qualitative approach to the development
strategy may be called for, encompassing an increased emphasis on enter-
prise training, a reduced labour-market duality and the establishment of
a well-functioning social safety net that covers all individuals.Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
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Labour market reform and social safety net policies in KoreaIt is particularly important to:
n improve the quality of education
and foster enterprise training
n effectively expand the coverage of
both the Employment Insurance
System (EIS) and social assistance
benefits, while scaling back pro-
grammes adopted as a temporary
response to the crisis
n ensure that employers pay their
contributions to the employment
security and public pension sys-
tems and, provided that is the case,
gradually reduce enterprise retire-
ment allowances for regular work-
ers, thereby reducing the marked
duality that presently exists and
laying the ground for higher pro-
ductivity gains
n better target active labour market
policies (ALMPs), enhance the
quality of the Public Employment
Services (PES) staff and undertake
rigorous evaluations of the pro-
grammes; and
n make sure that work continues to
pay in Korea.
Obviously, these measures need to be
adopted in a context of full respect for
basic workers’ rights and, in this
sense, resolving remaining industrial
relations issues should rank high in
the policy agenda. In a modern, pro-
ductive economy, it is important
that all social actors be involved in
the reform process in a climate of
mutual respect and trust.
What role 
has labour and 
social policy played 
in the recovery?
The Tripartite Commission has
been instrumental in achieving
agreement between the social part-
ners and the government on the
response to the crisis. Thus, the Tri-
partite Agreement of February 1998
urged the major industrial conglom-
erates (chaebols) to improve the
effectiveness and accountability of
corporate governance and introduce
greater transparency of their manage-
ment and accounts. In addition, the
agreement recommended a substan-
tial reduction in the indebtedness of
the chaebols. In order to facilitate
enterprise restructuring, it was also
decided to make it legally possible for
firms to dismiss workers for “urgent
managerial reasons”, and greater flex-
ibility was introduced in the area of
temporary work through the legalisa-
tion of agencies for so-called “dis-
patched workers”.
In addition, wage moderation has
been substantial. In 1998, average
nominal wages per employee fell by
2-1/2 per cent, equivalent to a cut
by almost 10 per cent in real terms
(which is unusually large by OECD
standards), cushioning the effects
of the crisis on unemployment.
Such wage moderation was mainly
attributable to the dramatic cut in
bonuses and overtime payments,
which account for a significant por-
tion of Korean wages and are mainly
determined by firms’ economic per-
formance. In 1999, as a result of
increased overtime and bonus pay-
ments, real wages rose robustly (by
over 10 per cent), so recuperating
their pre-crisis level. However,
since in the meantime labour pro-
ductivity has increased (by about
6 per cent, cumulatively, in 1998-99),
real unit labour costs have been
reduced, thereby improving business
profitability and providing room for
reducing corporate indebtedness.
Together with the depreciation of the
Won in 1998, these wage and produc-
tivity trends have enhanced the cost-
competitiveness of the Korean econ-
omy, contributing to an export-led
recovery.
Also, a wide range of labour market
programmes was either strength-
ened or introduced since the start of
the crisis. This has helped provide a
degree of social insurance for job
losers and their families and main-
tain the employability of many indi-
viduals who otherwise might have
lost contact with the labour market.
R e f l e c t i n g  t h e s e  e f f o r t s ,
government expenditures on labour
market programmes increased from
negligible levels in 1997 to 2-1/
4 per cent of GDP in 1998 and 3-1/
4 per cent in 1999. Finally, an effort
has been made to provide modest
social assistance support to those
who have fallen out of the social
safety net, thereby alleviating social
hardship and making the much-
needed structural reforms socially
sustainable. n
What are the 
remaining 
challenges?
The Korean economy still faces sev-
eral major labour market and social
policy challenges as it seeks to con-
solidate the recovery and the social
sustainability of its development
This Policy Brief presents the sum-
mary and conclusions of a Review
prepared by the OECD Secretariat
and published in mid-2000 under
the  t i t le  Pushing Ahead wi th
Reform in Korea: Labour Market
and Social Safety Net Policies. n
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Labour market reform and social safety net policies in Koreaprocess. First, it is more necessary
than ever to create a less confronta-
tional and more consensual system
of industrial relations if the Korean
economy and society is to modern-
ise and prosper. Unfortunately, past
confrontational attitudes between
the social partners have re-surfaced
in a context of economic recovery.
The result is that consensus on
wage moderation and reforms of
employment conditions and work-
force practices are increasingly dif-
ficult to achieve.
Second, joblessness remains a prob-
lem. True, open unemployment is
low by international comparison
but, unlike the case of many other
OECD countries, the majority of
unemployed workers do not receive
any unemployment benefits. In
addition, the degree of labour mar-
ket slack is significantly higher than
suggested by the open unemploy-
ment rate, as indicated by the high
number of discouraged workers
(the total participation rate in 1999
was 1.7 percentage points lower
than in 1997) and of participants in
labour market programmes such as
public works. Importantly, the
youth (especially those with high-
school education) are dispropor-
tionately affected by unemploy-
ment, suggesting that school-to-
work transition is difficult in Korea.
Third, jobs tend to be much more
precarious in Korea than is the case
in most other OECD countries.
Only 30 per cent of the employed
have a “regular” (i.e. permanent)
contract, which is the lowest figure
in the OECD area, followed by Tur-
key. Another third have a temporary
or daily job. As a result, job tenure
in Korea is low by international
comparison – on average, workers
stay with the same employer about
six years, compared with over 11
years in Japan and 7-1/2 years in the
United States. Importantly, the inci-
dence of non-regular jobs in small
businesses and among women is
very high. As the recovery gets
firmly established, the expectation
is that employers will become more
confident about the economic pros-
pects and that, as a result, they will
be less reluctant to convert non-reg-
ular jobs into regular ones. How-
ever, it should be stressed that the
incidence of regular employment
did not increase much in 1990-97, a
period characterised by near-full
employment. Job precariousness
indeed seems to be a structural char-
acteristic of the Korean economy,
which is problematic not only from
the social point of view, but also for
reasons of economic efficiency. Job
precariousness seems to be associated
with a relatively low incidence of
vocational training (in particular in
small businesses), in turn inhibiting
productivity growth.
Fourth, income inequalities have
started to widen. Over the past
three years, average incomes of the
poorest 20 per cent of households
have declined by over 8 per cent,
while aver-age incomes of the rich-
est 20 per cent of households have
increased somewhat.
Fifth, a large number of households
live with very low incomes. In
1999, 8 to 12 per cent of Koreans
(depending on the source) were
officially estimated to live in pov-
erty – based on a minimum monthly
cost of l iving representing the
equivalent of US$ 350 (in purchas-
ing power parity terms). Job-losers,
the elderly and lone-parent house-
ho ld s  a re  d i sprop ort iona te ly
affected by poverty. The extended
family has long provided an effec-
tive source of income sup-port in
Korea – the so-called “Confucian
social welfare.
Finally, the productivity of the
Korean economy is a matter of con-
cern. Past economic growth per-
formance rested on a formidable
investment effort: during the 1990-
97 period, share of national income
devoted to real fixed capital accu-
mulation averaged 37 per cent, a
very high figure by international
comparison. The returns from some
of these investments, however, have
turned out to be very small or even
negative – one of the underlying
factors behind the 1997 crisis.
Reflecting the poor returns from
many investment projects, multi-
factor productivity (a measure of
overall economic efficiency) stag-
nated over the period 1990-97,
while it grew in nearly all other
OECD countries. Clearly, in order
to strengthen the growth process in
the future,  i t  is  essential  that
resources are used more produc-
tively than hitherto. Addressing
t hese  ch a l l e nges  requ i re s  a n
improvement in the coverage and
effectiveness of labour market and
social safety-net programmes, while
also making further progress in
bringing industrial relations and
labour laws into line with interna-
tionally agreed standards. n
What can be done to 
improve the labour 
relations climate?
Addressing these key challenges
requires, first, a consolidation of
freedom-of-association and collec-
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recall the context under which the
issue of freedom-of-association
rights has been discussed in the
OECD. Aware of concerns regarding
these rights, the OECD Council,
when inviting Korea to join the
organisation in October 1996, wel-
comed the commitments made by
the Korean authorities “to reform
existing laws on industrial relations
in  l ine  w i th  in te rna t iona l l y -
accepted standards, including those
concerning basic rights such as
freedom of association and collec-
tive bargaining”. The Council also
instructed the OECD’s Employ-
ment, Labour and Social Affairs
(ELSA) Committee to “monitor
closely the progress made on labour
law reforms in the light of that
commitment”. In discussions on
these issues in the Council, the
ELSA Committee and other interna-
tional fora (notably at the Inter-
national Labour Organisation and
its Committee on Freedom of Asso-
ciation), attention has centred on a
number of areas where Korean law
and practice in industrial relations
was believed to be in conflict with
internationally-accepted standards.
These include issues of trade union
pluralism, third-party intervention
in collective bargaining, the right to
organise of public servants and
teachers, the right to strike in the
public sector, trade union member-
ship of dismissed or unemployed
workers and the payment by com-
panies of their full-time trade union
officials. Concerns have also been
voiced in these fora about the arrest
and imprisonment of trade union-
ists for activities that would be
regarded as pursuit of legitimate
trade union goals in other Member
countries.
Since the start of the monitoring
process, there is no doubt that the
legislative reforms have shifted
Korean labour laws significantly in
the desired direction. Major exam-
ples include the recognition of the
principle of trade union pluralism,
the legalisation of teachers’ unions,
freedom for many civil servants to
engage in workplace associations,
the gradual reduction of the list of
so-called “essential services” where
compulsory arbitration applies, as
well as the recent recognition of the
KCTU as the second national trade
union centre.  In addit ion,  the
government has decided to allow,
from 2002 onwards, trade union
pluralism at the enterprise level.
However, there are some outstand-
ing issues and resolving them
would probably contribute to create
a climate of trust between the social
partners. First, civil servants are not
allowed to join trade unions and
bargain collectively. Second, trade
unions face legal and practical
impediments in deciding who to
accept as members. Third, the law
will, as of 2002, prohibit the pay-
ment of full-time union officials.
O n  t h e s e  t h re e  i s s u e s ,  t h e
government, in consultation with
social partners, should explore ave-
nues for amending the relevant pro-
visions of the law. Finally, over the
past few years, waves of militant
trade union action and subsequent
arrests of trade unionists have suc-
ceeded each other. It will thus be
particular ly important for  the
Korean authorities to take all the
necessary steps to avoid large-scale
arrests and detentions of trade
unionists engaged in pursuit of
union activities. In particular, legal
provisions, which are often used to
arrest trade unionists for what other
OECD countries consider legiti-
mate trade union activities, need to
be revised or used with utmost
restraint.
Alongside further progress on the
legislative front, concern remains
about the present climate of indus-
trial relations in Korea at both the
national and enterprise levels. The
repeated withdrawals  by both
labour and business representatives
from the Tripartite Commission and
the lack of any agreed agenda and
timetable for its discussions are dis-
turbing. In order to foster social
dialogue and mutual trust in the
Tr i p a r t i t e  C o m m i s s i o n ,  t h e
government could take the lead by
presenting reform proposals for dis-
cussion in the Commission. Need-
less to say, the government should
also make appropriate efforts to act
upon compromises reached within
the Commission (as required by the
1999 Tripartite Commission Act),
while the social partners need to
recognise the futility of “empty
chair” attitudes and come forward
themselves with constructive pro-
posals rather than always looking to
the government to solve deadlocks.
Perhaps more importantly from the
point of view of Korean productiv-
ity performance, tripartite agree-
ments at the national level need to
be supplemented by active labour-
management consultat ion and
effective co-operation at the enter-
prise level. n
How can labour 
market duality be 
reduced?
Second, to the extent that the public
pension system is made sustainable,
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While the new lay-off provisions are
clearly a step in the direction of
increasing numerical flexibility in
firms, “regular” workers still enjoy
a relatively high degree of employ-
ment protection compared with
their counterparts in other OECD
countries. The one-month notice
period, even for workers with high
tenure, is low by international
standards, but the legal severance
pay requirements applying to regu-
lar workers would seem to be rela-
tively onerous. In addition, the
preconditions for dismissals based
on economic reasons (advance noti-
fication to a trade union, verifiable
efforts to avoid dismissal, etc.)
make conditions in Korea resemble
closely those in other high-protec-
tion countries such as Japan, Portu-
gal, France or Germany. Finally, the
new provisions on notification of
collective dismissals to the Ministry
of Labour correspond to the strict
regulations in force in EU countries.
Overall, the OECD has ranked
Korea as the second strictest coun-
try out of 27 member countries in
terms of protection of regular (or
permanent) employment contracts.
There would therefore seem to be
room for easing the legal severance
pay requirements for regular work-
ers. This reform, however, should
t a k e  p l a c e  g r ad u a l l y,  a n d  be
dependent on the Employment
Insurance System (EIS) becoming
more firmly established in coming
years; and the public pension sys-
tem being adequately funded,
which is far from being the case at
present, and pension benefits pro-
viding sufficient income support.
Relaxing relatively strict employ-
ment protection for regular work-
ers, under the above conditions,
could also help ease job instability
for temporary and daily workers
(who form the core of “outsiders” in
Korea).  This  would hopefully
encourage employers to convert
more non-regular contracts into
regular ones, thereby reducing the
degree of labour market segmenta-
tion, which is presently very pro-
nounced, and laying the ground for
greater investment in on-the-job
training. In addition, the social pro-
tection of fixed-term and daily
workers should be enhanced. n
How well are labour 
market programmes 
working?
Labour market programmes have to
be evaluated in the light of their
twin objectives, namely to provide
income support to the unemployed;
and to foster the future employment
and earnings prospects of unem-
ployed workers, while minimising
the dead-weight, substitution and
displacement effects often associ-
ated with such policies. Regarding
the first objective, the portfolio of
labour market programmes has
been expanded considerably in the
past two years. However, official
estimates show that only one in
eight of the unemployed receive
unemployment benefits (in addi-
tion, less than half participate in
some type of labour market pro-
gramme, the others being potential
clients for social assistance bene-
fits). It has recently been decided to
expand the scope of the EIS to cover
daily workers, but there remain
serious implementation problems,
in particular among small firms
which often evade the payment of
social contributions. The current
situation is not satisfactory and the
government should assign a high
priority to increasing the coverage
of the EIS and make sure that vul-
nerable groups are not left unpro-
tected, as is presently the case. n
As to the labour market effects of
labour market programmes, it is not
possible to draw clear-cut conclu-
sions in the absence of any system-
atic evaluations. However, based on
the examination of specific design
features of the programmes, the fol-
lowing observations can be made:
n there is a general lack of targeting
in many of the programmes. As a
result, it is unclear whether they
really reach disadvantaged groups,
such as unemployed workers not
covered by the EIS and young
unemployed workers. Targeting is
especially important in the case of
subsidies to SMEs, given that this
programme is the largest in terms
of government spending on active
l a bou r  ma rk e t  p ro g ramm es
(ALMPs); 
n despite a general lack of targeting,
some of the programmes are not
much used. This suggests that
some regrouping of programmes
may be called for, notably in the
area of employment maintenance
subsidies;
n now that a brisk recovery is under-
way, there is a strong case for scal-
ing back substantially public
works programmes. International
evidence suggests that these pro-
grammes, unless they are well tar-
geted on hard-to-place groups, are
particularly susceptible to large
dead-weight losses;
n there may be cases where work
does not pay – leading to a risk
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to stay in the programme rather
than look actively for a private-
sector job. For instance, remuner-
ation in public works programmes
reportedly competes with market
wages in certain unskilled occupa-
tions;
n training institutions have had dif-
ficulties in coping with the rapid
and massive expansion of training
programmes. In addition, the type
of training provided by some of
them may not be closely tied to
the requirements of a complex,
modern economy such as Korea.
For these reasons, there is a good
case for a greater involvement of
social partners at the local indus-
try level in programme design,
while also expanding the training
capacity; and
n the outcomes of the programmes
should be carefully monitored and
evaluated.
Finally,  the role of the public
employment service (PES) in the
design and implementation of
ALMPs could be enhanced. The
concept of the “one-stop office” is a
good one, and should be general-
ised by integrating the separate net-
works of Employment Security
Centres and Manpower Banks.
Also, while it may have been useful
in the period of rising unemploy-
ment to operate another chain of
placement offices under the author-
ity of municipalities and other local
governments, the rationale behind
the co-existence of two types of
“public employment services”, one
under the Labour Ministry and the
other under local government, that
are involved in the same types of
tasks (apart from benefit payment),
may need to be reviewed.
As mass unemployment declines,
PES officers will need to devote
more efforts to counselling and
monitoring of those job-seekers
who are at high risk of long-term
unemployment and benefit depend-
ency – at present there is little “pro-
f i l i n g ” .  N e e d l e s s  t o  s a y,  t h e
efficiency of the PES crucially
depends on the quality of its staff
and the high turnover of counsel-
lors is problematic is this respect. In
present circumstances, improving
training and job stability of the staff
might be more important than
increasing the number of officers.
The steep decline in unemployment
should prov ide  the  necessary
breathing space to concentrate on
improving the quality of PES staff.
In addition, Korea should seek to
take advantage of the extensive net-
work of private employment agencies
that presently exist. These agencies
have an excellent inter-mediation
record in the unskilled labour market
and the PES could seek complemen-
tarities with them, for example by
contracting out the placement of low-
educated unemployed. n
What about 
social assistance 
programmes?
After the crisis, given the relatively
low coverage of unemployment
benefits and other labour market pro-
grammes, demand for social assist-
ance benefits increased dramatically.
The authori t ies  responded by
expanding the existing programme
and creating a new one, specifically
targeted on low-income individuals
of working age. In 1999, nearly 2 mil-
lion individuals received social assist-
ance  benef i ts .  This ,  however,
represents only about half of the esti-
mated number of persons living in
poverty in that year.
The weaknesses of the present
socia l  ass is tance  system have
prompted the Korean authorities to
enact a new system, namely the
National Basic Livelihood Security
Law (NBLS), to take effect as from
1 O ctober 2000.  The  concept
underlying the new social assist-
ance law is that of “productive wel-
fare”, i.e. the purpose is to provide
adequate income support while also
encouraging benefit recipients to
participate in the labour market.
Thus, it is officially estimated that
the proportion of individuals living
in poverty that will receive benefits
will be increased to two thirds after
the new law comes into force. In
addition, the level of benefits will
be raised.
However, it is important to stress
that many low-income individuals
will remain unprotected under the
NBLS. This might reflect the fact
that benefit entitlement is subject to
unusually strict income criteria,
based on the income capacity (and
not actual income) of the extended
family. This particular provision of
the law will have to be revised, if the
official target of providing benefits
of last resort to those in need is to
be reached. Also, despite their
increase, benefits will remain very
modest. The authorities should
consider raising them, perhaps in
stages, so that they reach at least the
poverty line.
In addition, making productive
welfare a reality requires local
government officials responsible for
the delivery and administration of
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their work ability and provide
employment-oriented counselling
services. Based on the experience of
other OECD countries, it is possible
to identify certain policy avenues
which could help meet these goals: 
n at present, there are about 250
recipients to each welfare officer,
compared with an OECD norm of
80 to 120 recipients per officer.
Korean welfare officers simply do
not have the time to screen and
adjudicate clients on their work-
ability or provide intensive job-
counselling services. The authori-
ties have undertaken to hire addi-
tional welfare officers so that the
number of recipients per welfare
officer declines to 200, but many
more would need to be hired and
trained. Welfare officers will
require adequate funds to provide
job-counselling or, in certain cases,
offer social assistance recipients the
possibility to attend training
courses. In this regard, the authori-
ties could consider the implemen-
tation of pilot projects, allowing
private agencies to tender for the
provision of employment services
to NBLS clients. To encourage job
search, it may be helpful to intro-
duce in the NBLS a mechanism of
earnings disregards which permits
recipients to keep their benefits
while at the same time earning an
income, up to a certain threshold.
Such a system would have to be
rather different from the one
embodied in the current set-up.
Current financial arrangements
b e t w e e n  d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s  o f
government may be conducive to a
waste of resources. At present, most
of the budget for social assistance
b e n e f i t s  c o me s  f rom  ce n t r a l
government, while local govern-
ments (and their welfare officers)
are in charge of the delivery of ben-
efits. In such a setting, local govern-
ments have a weak incentive to
enforce the different eligibility criteria
and they might therefore be inclined
to provide benefits to whoever asks
for them. Up to now, the central
government has addressed this prob-
lem by announcing strict budget lim-
its, effectively imposing hard-budget
constraints on local governments.
But, under the NBLS, the plan is to
provide social assistance benefits as of
right. Even so, it seems desirable to
maintain the current budgetary
“grant-based” system and not give the
certainty to local governments that
their financial demands will always
be satisfied. n
And education 
and training?
The average educational attainment
of the Korean population and work
force has increased spectacularly
over the past decades, contributing
to the rapid growth performance.
Practically one fifth of the total
Korean population has a college
degree, the highest figure in the
OECD after the United States and
the Netherlands. However, there is
a need for improving the quality
and relevance of education and
training, in order to raise multi-fac-
tor productivity and allow Korean
firms to compete effectively in the
21st century. n
How can much-
needed programmes 
be financed?
Some of the measures advocated
above will exert upward pressures
on government spending, raising
the  i ssue  of  how they  can be
financed. In the case of an expan-
sion of the EIS, extending the cov-
erage of benefits to workers of small
enterprises, which often do not pay
the social contributions, risks creat-
ing a deficit in the EIS. In order to
prevent this, it is essential that the
government step up its efforts to
make all firms pay their social con-
t r i b u t i o n s .  O t h e r w i s e ,  t h e
government may face pressures for
subsidising the EIS. In the case of
programmes financed by central
government, notably social assist-
ance benefits for which an expan-
sion is also planned, resources can
be found by scaling down tempo-
rary programmes such as public
works and unemployment loans.
Further savings could materialise if
rigorous evaluations of ALMPs were
carried out, thereby reducing the risk
of waste of existing resources. Should
these savings prove insufficient, the
government could consider raising
tax revenues. Preferably, this should
be done by enlarging the tax base
(through an intensified campaign
against tax evasion and a reduction of
the generous tax allowances and
exemptions that presently exist)
rather than raising tax rates which, at
between 10 and 40 per cent, are not
particularly low by OECD standards.
In any case, general government rev-
enues represent about 25 per cent of
GDP, which is, after Mexico, the low-
est figure among OECD countries
for which comparable data exist. n
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